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The Relationship Between Expatriates, Parent Company-Affiliate Integration and HRM 
Control in the Overseas Affiliates of Japanese and American MNCs 
This paper examines the relationship between the level of parent company-subunit integration, 
parent control over the affiliate, and affiliate performance in a sample of 69 Japanese business 
units in the United States and 89 American business units in Japan. A discussion of the results 
and their implications are presented. 
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Introduction 
A major feature of MNCs is their ability to utilize internal and external resources 
available to them around the world. Thus, their competitive advantages usually come from 
being able to effectively integrate their world-wide operations to achieve economies of scale, 
scope, and learning (Kogut, 1985; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1987, 1989). In the context of 
today's global economic environment, the issues of international integration and control have 
become critical ones for MNCs (e.g., Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1987; Martinez and Jarillo, 
1991; Gupta and Govindarajan, 1991; Sohn, 1994). For example, Bartlett and Ghoshal have 
argued that it is those firms which exhibit high levels of local responsiveness and global 
integration of their operations which will outperform their competitors. 
Creating the organizational capacity for global integration is no simple matter, 
however. It requires a set of management structures and processes which are difficult to 
implement, given the geographic and cultural distances between the far-flung operations of 
multinational firms. In order to compete in the highly competitive international arena, MNCs 
must develop and implement the coordination and control mechanisms necessary to manage 
high levels of integration (Doz and Prahalad, 1981; Gupta and Govindarajan, 1991). 
While most previous research in this area has focused attention on the MNC as a 
whole, this paper builds on a small but growing body of research which focuses on the level of 
the overseas business unit or affiliate (see e.g., Doz and Prahalad, 1981, Gupta and 
Govindarajan, 1991; Rosenzweig and Singh, 1991). In this paper, we explore the 
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relationships between parent company-affiliate integration, control, and affiliate performance. 
While both environmental and organizational factors influence these relationships, in this 
study, we have focused our attention on organizational factors while controlling for host 
country environment by examining two distinct populations of firms, each operating in a 
different environment: affiliates of Japanese MNCs located in the United States and affiliates 
of American MNCs located in Japan. 
Resource Dependence 
The primary theoretical underpinnings for our hypotheses are rooted in exchange theory 
(e.g., Blau, 1964) and the resource dependence framework (Aldrich, 1976; Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978). The resource dependence approach begins with the premise that an 
organization is unable to generate all of the resources necessary to maintain itself. It must 
therefore enter into transactions with elements in its environment that can supply the required 
resources and services (Aldrich, 1976). 
There are three factors which are critical in determining the dependence of one actor on 
another (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), and hence the need for control: (1) the more important 
the resource is to the organization; (2) the more discretion another party has over the allocation 
and use of the resource; and (3) the fewer the number of alternatives for the resource (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978). 
In MNCs, the parent company relies to varying degrees on its foreign subunits for 
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certain essential resources and it is therefore dependent upon those affiliates. The nature of the 
relationship is not, however, unidirectional. It is important to note that there is reciprocal 
interdependence between the subunit and the parent company as a whole. They are dependent 
upon each other and each will therefore seek to exercise control over the relationship. Our 
focus here, however, is upon the exercise of control by the parent company over the subunit, 
rather than vice versa. 
While dependence can be a function of the nature of the business unit's role within the 
MNC's strategy, its size (Martinez and Jarillo, 1991) , the market size and criticality of the 
host country environment in which the business unit is located (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989), 
Gupta and Govindarajan (1991) note that the critical factor determining the level of control and 
coordination in MNCs is the level of integration between the parent company and the overseas 
subunit. We therefore expect that; PI: Higher levels of parent company integration with its 
overseas subunits will be associated with greater levels of parent company control. 
While "integration" has been subject to various interpretations and operationalizations 
in the literature, Gupta and Govindarajan (1991) measure integration by the resource flows 
between the parent company and the subunit. They identify three types of resource flows in 
organizations: capital, product, and knowledge flows and hypothesize that the greater the flow 
of resources between the parent company and its overseas subunits, the greater the need for 
control and coordination mechanisms to effectively manage that interdependence (see also 
Egelhoff, 1984; Cray, 1984; Mascarenhas, 1984). We therefore predict that: 
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HI: The greater the level of resource flows between the parent company and its overseas 
subunit, the higher the level of control that will be exercised by the parent company over its 
overseas affiliate. 
Control: Clan and Bureaucratic Controls 
In writing about control in American versus Japanese firms, a number of authors (e.g., 
Ouchi, 1980, 1981; Baliga and Jaeger, 1984) have argued that American firms are 
characterized by bureaucratic mechanisms of control while Japanese firms use clan 
mechanisms of control. While empirical research on this question has been relatively sparse 
and has primarily been case study based, the results indicate that Japanese firms seem to be 
characterized by high levels employee training and intense corporate socialization, long length 
of tenure in the firm, and low levels of absenteeism and turnover (Johnson and Ouchi, 19??; 
Ouchi, 1981?; Baliga and Jaeger, 1984). American firms, on the other hand, have relatively 
higher levels of bureaucratic control mechanisms, such as rules and regulations, and rely less 
on clan mechanisms of control (Ouchi, 1981?; Baliga and Jaeger, 1984). Based on previous 
research, we therefore predict that: 
H3: American affiliates will tend to use higher levels of bureaucratic control than Japanese 
firms. 
Some authors have argued that bureaucratic control mechanisms, such as the 
formalization of explicit policies, can be used in place of direct, clan controls (Baliga and 
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Jaeger, 1984). Other authors assert that the two forms are complementary and that use of one 
form of control may not preclude the use of other forms (see Child, 1984 for a summary of 
this debate). Theoretically, the argument could be made for either hypothesis. However, a 
previous study of Japanese affiliates in Southeast Asia (Beechler, 1992) found that the level of 
clan control was not influenced by the level of bureaucratic control exercised by the parent 
company over the affiliate. Based on this research, we therefore predict that: 
H4: There will no relationship between the use of bureaucratic and clan mechanisms of control 
exercised by the parent company over the affiliate. 
Clan and bureaucratic controls represent two critical forms of managerial control. 
Financial ownership is another obvious and powerful form of control which will influence the 
need for managerial control (Hayashi, 19??). We therefore control for parent company 
ownership in the analyses reported below. 
Control: Expatriate Presence 
In the international context, it is often difficult to effectively use control mechanisms 
such as rules and regulations because of home country-host country differences and the 
complexity of the international operating environment (Baliga and Jaeger, 1984). In addition, 
it can be costly, particularly in a cross-cultural environment, to invest significant resources in 
the training and socialization of local employees. MNCs therefore often use a cadre of 
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international executives, usually expatriates from the home country whose loyalties lie with the 
parent firm, to help oversee and control their overseas operations (Edstrom and Galbraith, 
1976; Boyacigiller, 1990b). 
Therefore, expatriates in overseas subunits often act as key coordination and control 
mechanisms for the parent company (Edstrom and Galbraith, 1977; Baliga and Jaeger, 1984; 
Boyacigiller, 1990b; Cray, 1984; Boyacigiller, 1990a, 1990b; Sohn, 1994) and play an 
essential role in the successful implementation of strategy in MNCs. We therefore predict 
that, in general: 
Hla: The greater the integration between the parent company and its overseas subunit, the 
greater the expatriate presence in the subunit. 
At the same time, the strength of this relationship may vary with the nationality of the 
parent firm. Previous work (e.g., Yoshino, 1976; Negandhi, 1979; Tung, 1982; Trevor 1983; 
Beechler, 1992; Kopp, 1994) has shown that while Western MNCs tend to rely on more 
bureaucratic forms of control such as written reports, communications between the subunit and 
the parent company, etc., the use of expatriates is particularly important in Japanese MNCs for 
language, cultural and organizational reasons. While previous authors (e.g., Baliga and 
Jaeger, 1984) have used the presence of expatriates as a measure of clan control, our own 
research (e.g., Beechler, 1992) has shown that expatriates can function as either a clan 
mechanism or a bureaucratic mechanism of control - expatriates may be sent overseas to train 
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and socialize local employees into the corporate culture but there are a number of other reasons 
for expatriation. Expatriates can be assigned overseas to facilitate technology transfer, to 
socialize local employees, for career development (Edstrom and Galbraith, 1977), or to 
monitor the behaviors and outcomes at the affiliate (Boyacigiller, 1990b; Beechler, 1992). 
While we do not explore the roles of expatriates in the affiliates in this sample, based on 
previous research we predict that: 
H2: Japanese affiliates will have higher levels of expatriate presence than their American 
counterparts. 
Finally, a number of authors writing in the international strategy literature have argued 
that for MNCs operating in global industries, organizational performance is a function of the 
MNC's capability to be simultaneously globally integrated and locally responsive. The 
capacity to integrate the MNC's operations worldwide, however, is complex and there are very 
few companies which have been able to accomplish this effectively (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 
1989). This is partially due to the fact that higher levels of integration, because they increase 
the level of interdependence within the MNC, require higher levels of control. Without this 
control, high levels of integration are unlikely to yield positive performance outcomes. We 
therefore would expect that: 
H5: For those affiliates whose operations are highly integrated with those of the parent 
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company, level of parent company control over the affiliate will have a positive relationship 
with the level of performance of the subunit. 
Methods 
The results reported here are a subset of a larger study conducted between 1989 and 
1992 of the strategy, human resource management practices, and performance of 69 Japanese 
affiliates located in the United States and 89 American affiliates located in Japan. Data were 
collected through written questionnaires mailed to the managing director or human resource 
director at each affiliate. 
In the United States, a total of 219 questionnaires were mailed to a non-random sample 
of Japanese-owned companies located throughout the United States. These companies had all 
been involved in an earlier study of labor practices in overseas affiliates. Sixty-nine of the 219 
firms returned usable surveys for a response rate of 32%. 
In Japan, questionnaires were mailed to the entire population of American affiliates 
which were listed in the directory of the American Chamber of Commerce in Japan. Four 
hundred seventy nine questionnaires were mailed to the managing directors of these affiliates, 
and of these, a total of 99 firms responded, for a response rate of 21 %. Because of missing 
data on the variables explored in this paper, 10 of these questionnaires were unusable, 
yielding a usable sample size of 89 American affiliates in Japan. 
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Variables Used in the Study 
A list of all of the variables used in the analyses and their means and standard 
deviations are presented in Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the sample as a whole and for 
the two subsamples are also presented separately. 
Table 1 About Here 
Measures of Integration 
Building on the recent work of Gupta and Govindarajan (1991) who argue that control 
and coordination in MNCs is a function of the resource flows between the parent company and 
the subunit, we also measured integration using resource inflows and outflows between the 
parent company and the affiliate. 
Respondents were asked to estimate the percentage of the subunit's total outputs 
(products or services) which was sold to the parent company in its home country and the 
percentage of outputs which was bought and sold to other branches, joint ventures, and 
subsidiaries of the parent company outside of its home country. Similarly, respondents were 
asked to indicate the percentage of inputs which were purchased from the parent company and 
its other affiliates. Thus, we are able to measure both the magnitude of the level of product-
based resource flows and the directionality of those flows (Gupta and Govindarajan, 1991). In 
the analyses below, we have created three variables from this information to measure 
integration: Total input, Total output, and a multiplicative interaction of Total input x Total 
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output. 
We used one additional measure of integration since our first measure only measured 
the flow of product/service inflows and outflows but does not incorporate flows of knowledge 
and capital. We asked respondents to indicate, across 17 functional areas (Table 2), the level 
of integration between the parent company and the affiliate (see appendix for questionnaire 
items). These responses were summed to create an index of functional integration (Integration 
of Business) where higher values on the index indicate higher levels of functional integration 
between the subunit and the parent company. 
Table 2 About Here 
Measures of Parent Company Control 
Management control is a critical issue for MNCs but is notoriously difficult to define 
and to measure. Different authors have both defined and operationalized international control 
in a myriad of ways (see Martinez and Jarillo, 1991 for an excellent review of the literature on 
international control and coordination). In this study we focused on control over human 
resources, since it is the human network which is critical in managing the integration between 
the parent company and its overseas subunits (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989). 
Clan Control 
Clan control, because of its informal nature, is difficult to measure and most studies 
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have used proxies such as number of expatriates (Baliga and Jaeger, 1984), length of service of 
employees, etc. In this study, we use a variety of measures which are described below. 
Bureaucratic Control 
Two measures of bureaucratic control are used in this study and both are measures of 
the human resource management system in place at the affiliate. As described above, 
bureaucratic controls (Ouchi, 1977, 1979, 1981) are synonymous with formal control 
mechanisms (REF). We therefore measured the degree of explicitness and formality of a 
number of human resource management policies and practices in place in the overseas affiliate. 
HRM Explicitness was measured by creating an index from responses to questionnaire items 
(see appendix for items) concerning the level of explicitness of the subunit's HRM planning, 
hiring and promotion, compensation, appraisal, and training and development policies. 
Responses were summed across the HRM functions and the total was then divided by the 
number of items in the index. A higher score on the index indicates a higher level of 
explicitness and bureaucratic control. HRM Formalness was measured by creating an index 
from responses to parallel questionnaire items (see appendix) concerning the level of formality 
of the subunit's HRM policies. A higher score on the index indicates a higher level of 
formality and bureaucratic control. 
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Expatriate Presence 
In this study, we used two measures of expatriate presence: the percentage of 
expatriates in the top three levels of management at the affiliate (Expatriates/Top Managers) 
and the percentage of expatriates in all levels of management (Percent of Expatriates). 
Measures of Affiliate Performance 
Measuring the performance of overseas subunits, particularly of Japanese MNCs, is 
extremely difficult for two critical reasons: Japanese accounting laws do not require 
unconsolidated reporting so there are no publicly available figures and performance figures are 
considered to be confidential and proprietary data. Furthermore, performance data at the 
subunit level are generally unreliable since such inputs as internal transfer prices are 
manipulated for taxation and other reasons (Rosenzweig, 1994). 
Although all measures of performance are imperfect, we chose to measure performance 
through self-reported ratings of the subunit's performance. Previous research on both 
domestic and international operations (e.g., Dess & Robinson, 1984; Geringer and Hebert, 
1991; Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1986, 1987) has found that subjective and objective 
measures of performance are highly correlated, supporting the general reliability of self-
reported performance measures. Since all respondents are top level executives in the business 
unit with knowledge of the subunit's actual performance and because they were guaranteed 
anonymity, these self-report measures, used in a number of studies of global strategy (e.g., 
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Samiee and Roth, 1992; Morrison and Roth, 1992) are reasonable proxies in the absence of 
objective measures. 
A number of performance measures were included in this study, all based on 
respondents' assessments of their affiliate's past and current performance (see appendix for 
questionnaire items). Respondents were first asked to assess their subunit's performance for 
the past year (Current Performance). 
In addition, respondents were asked to assess their current overall level of performance 
(Overall Performance) and their performance compared to their main competitors 
(Comparative Performance). Finally, respondents were asked to rate their business unit's 
performance on a variety of measures including profitability, sales volume, return on sales, 
etc. (see appendix of a list of the individual items). Responses were summed to create an 
index of performance (Performance Scale). All of the performance variables are coded such 
that higher values indicate higher levels of affiliate performance. 
Control Variables 
A number of control variables were entered in the analyses reported below since all of 
these variables could influence the level of integration, control and/or performance of the 
affiliate. 
Age (Age) of the affiliate was coded as the number of years since its establishment in 
the host country. 
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The method of founding of the subsidiary (greenfield site or acquisition) was measured 
as a dummy variable (Founding), with a value of 0 indicating an acquisition and a value of 1 
indicating a greenfield site. 
Financial control by the parent company over the overseas subunit (Ownership) was 
measured as the percentage of subunit capital owned by the parent company. 
Business unit size (# of Employees) was measured by current number of employees. 
Industry indicates whether the MNC is a manufacturing or service firm. This variable 
was coded as a dummy variable with the value of 0 assigned to manufacturing firms and a 
value of 1 assigned to service firms. 
Country of origin (Japan or the United States) was also entered as a dummy variable 
(Country) where a value of 0 indicates that the parent company is American and a value of 1 
indicates that the parent company is Japanese. 
Finally, past performance (Past Performance) was also included as a control variable in 
the regression analyses on affiliate performance reported below. 
Results 
Correlations between all of the variables used in the analyses are presented in 
Table 3 below. 
Table 3 About Here 
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Using difference in means tests between the two subsamples, we find that there are 
significant differences between the American and Japanese affiliates on six of the variables 
included in the analyses (see Table 1). First, American-owned affiliates in Japan are 
significantly older than the Japanese-owned American affiliates (mean=21.62 vs. 13.25 
years; p < .05). In addition, American-owned affiliates have significantly more employees 
(mean=492.72) than the Japanese-owned affiliates in the sample (mean=209.96). 
Consistent with previous studies we find that Japanese-owned affiliates have a higher 
proportion of expatriate managers than do American-owned affiliates and the proportion of 
expatriates in the top three levels of management is significantly greater in Japanese-owned 
affiliates (mean=67% vs. 23% in American-owned affiliates; p < .05). While the proportion 
of expatriates to local managers is relatively high in the Japanese-owned affiliates, it is 
important to note that, on average, the actual number of expatriate personnel in the Japanese-
owned affiliates is 6.36, whereas for the American-owned affiliates the number is 9.53 (p< 
n.s.). 
In terms of ownership, the parent companies of American-owned affiliates in Japan 
have an average of 78.73% ownership while the parent companies of Japanese-owned affiliates 
in the United States hold an average of 91.97% (significant at p < .05). 
While there are no significant differences between the two subsamples in terms of 
integration across functional areas or total percentage of input received from the parent firm 
(see Table 1), Japanese-owned affiliates sell significantly more of their output to their parent 
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firms than do American-owned affiliates (mean=26.75% vs. 10.91% for American-owned 
affiliates; p<.05). 
Finally, the two subsamples do not differ significantly in their level of HRM 
explicitness or formality or on any of the performance measures, although the American-
owned affiliates do report slightly higher levels of performance on all of the measures (see 
Table 1). 
Regression Results 
In Hypothesis 1 we predicted that higher levels of integration between the parent 
company and its overseas subunit would be associated with higher levels of expatriate 
presence. First, using the level of product resource flows between the parent and the affiliate 
as the measure of integration, we see in Table 4 below that controlling for country of origin, 
industry, age of the affiliate, level of parent company ownership, number of employees, and 
method of founding that the interaction term between inputs received from the parent and 
outputs sold to the parent is significant at p < .05 (For Model 1: Adjusted R-square = .21; 
p < .05). As predicted, there is a positive relationship between expatriate presence and 
integration as measured by product/service resource flows (Model 1). However, there is no 
significant relationship between the level of functional integration and expatriate presence 
(Model 2). We therefore find only limited support for Hypothesis 1 in the total sample. 
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Table 4 About Here 
Since country of origin, entered as a control variable in the preceding analyses was 
significant, we performed parallel analyses for the American and Japanese subsamples 
separately. The results for the Japanese-owned affiliates are exactly the same as those found 
for the total sample as a whole (see Models 3-6, Table 4) and the only significant relationship 
is found in Model 3 between Total Input x Total Output and Percentage of Expatriates 
(p<.05). 
The results for the American-owned affiliates show that there are no significant 
relationships between expatriate presence and integration as measured by resource flows. In 
addition, while the results are not significant, we find that there is a negative relationship 
between Total Output and expatriate presence and between Integration of Business and 
expatriate presence. These results are opposite to those hypothesized. 
Finally, we also performed identical analyses for all three samples, replacing 
percentage of expatriates to total number of affiliate employees with the percentage of 
expatriates in the top three levels of management as the dependent variable. Although they are 
not reported here, these results are similar to those found for expatriates as a percentage of all 
managers. 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that Japanese-owned affiliates would have higher levels of 
expatriate presence than their American counterparts. We saw from the difference in means 
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tests (Table 1) that Japanese affiliates do have a significantly higher level of expatriate 
presence than American-owned affiliates. Using regression analyses controlling for industry, 
age of the affiliate, ownership, number of employees, and method of founding, we find that 
even with these controls, Japanese-owned affiliates still have significantly higher levels of 
expatriate presence in the top three levels of management and across all levels of management 
(p< .001). The regression models explain 17% (Top Three Levels) and 35% (Percentage of 
Managers) of the total variance in expatriate staffing and are significant at the p < .001 and 
.01 levels, respectively (see Table 5). 
Table 5 About Here 
We also predicted in Hypothesis 3 that American affiliates would tend to use higher 
levels of bureaucratic control than Japanese firms. We saw from the descriptive statistics 
(Table 1) that there were no significant differences between the means for the two subsamples 
on either HRM explicitness or formalness. However, we also conducted regression analyses 
on HRM Explicitness and HRM Formalness, controlling for industry, age of the affiliate, 
ownership, number of employees, and method of founding. As shown in Table 6, country of 
origin does not significantly predict either HRM Explicitness or HRM Formalness. 
Hypothesis 3 is therefore not supported. 
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Table 6 About Here 
Hypothesis 4 predicted that there would be no relationship between the use of 
bureaucratic and clan mechanisms of control exercised by the parent company over the 
subunit. As shown in Table 7, controlling for industry, age of the affiliate, ownership, 
number of employees, and method of founding, HRM Formalness and HRM Explicitness have 
positive but non-significant relationships with both measures of expatriate presence. These 
results support Hypothesis 4. 
We also tested for differences between the American- versus Japanese-owned affiliates, 
by splitting the sample and performing the same analyses on the two subsamples. Although 
they are not presented here, none of the predictors were significant and neither model 
explained a significant amount of variance in the dependent variable. 
Table 7 About Here 
Finally, Hypothesis 5 predicted that for affiliates whose operations are highly integrated 
with those of the parent company, level of parent company control over the affiliate would 
have a positive relationship with the level of performance of the affiliate. In order to test this 
relationship, we first split the total sample using a median split to form two subsamples based 
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on their level of integration (high and low as measured as resource flows). We then performed 
a number of regressions, using the different performance measures as the dependent variables 
and controlling for country of origin, industry, age, ownership, number of employees, method 
of founding, and past performance. 
We ran regressions using both the percentage of expatriates in the top three levels of 
management and the percentage of expatriates in management as a whole. Because the results 
are nearly identical, we present only those results for percentage of expatriates in top 
management in Table 8 below. This table shows that for highly integrated affiliates, the 
relationships between performance and HRM Explicitness and HRM Formalness are negative, 
although the relationships are only marginally significant (p < . 1) in the case of current 
performance (Model 1; Adjusted R-square = .12; p< n.s.). In addition, there are no 
significant relationships between expatriate presence and any of the performance measures. 
For highly integrated affiliates, there is no relationship between expatriate presence (clan 
control) and performance. In addition, there are either non-significant or significant negative 
relationships between the bureaucratic mechanisms of control and performance, contrary to our 
prediction. 
Interestingly, among the low integrated affiliates, the direction of the relationship 
between performance and the bureaucratic control measures is opposite to that for the high 
integrated firms. HRM Explicitness is positively related to performance across all three 
dependent variables and is highly significant in Models 1 and 3. HRM formalness is also 
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positively related to performance but the relationship is significant (p< .05) only for Model 3, 
using the performance scale as the dependent variable. Expatriate presence is not a significant 
predictor of performance for Models 2 and 3 but is marginally significant (p < . 1) for Model 1. 
The greater the percentage of expatriates among the top management team, the lower the 
performance of the affiliate. 
Table 8 About Here 
Discussion 
The results from this study support the conclusions of previous writers that Japanese-
owned affiliates tend to use expatriates to a greater extent than American-owned affiliates. We 
found that even controlling for age of the affiliate, number of employees, parent company 
ownership, method of founding, and type of industry, that Japanese-owned affiliates in this 
United States have significantly larger percentages of expatriates in both the top management 
team and in all levels of management. The presence of expatriates is generally not, however, 
associated with level of performance. 
Our results show that, contrary to our predictions, for highly integrated affiliates, there 
are no significant relationships between expatriate presence and any of the performance 
measures. In addition, the relationship between performance and the bureaucratic controls of 
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HRM Explicitness and HRM Formalness are negative. On the other hand, for the low 
integrated affiliates, HRM Explicitness and HRM Formalness are positively related to 
performance while expatriate presence shows a significant negative relationship with current 
performance. 
Because there are so many influences on affiliate performance at the organizational, 
subunit and individual levels, it is not surprising that the results reported above are not 
significant. However, further research exploring these relationships in more detail are needed. 
MNCs spend a tremendous amount of money staffing overseas operations with expatriates. It 
is important to determine whether, as it is often assumed, those expatriates do positively 
influence the performance of the firm. 
We also found that there are no significant relationships between bureaucratic and clan 
controls, indicating that the two types of controls may be complementary. In addition, while 
American-owned affiliates use significantly fewer expatriates, they do not use greater levels of 
HRM Explicitness or Formalness, which we characterized as bureaucratic mechanisms. This 
is in spite of the fact that, as a whole, the American-owned affiliates have lower levels of 
parent company ownership than their Japanese counterparts. These results lend to the tentative 
conclusion that compared to American MNCs, Japanese firms use higher levels of clan and 
financial controls and equivalent levels of bureaucratic controls in their overseas operations. 
While our results are provocative, it is important to note that we have used only a few 
of the possible measures for the constructs examined in this study. Further research using other 
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operationalizations of management control, integration, and organizational performance should 
be undertaken to more fully understand the complex nature of these relationships. 
In addition, the data used in this study are cross-sectional in nature. While we have 
measured associations between the variables, we are unable to determine causality between the 
constructs. For example, it would be interesting to know whether expatriates are used to 
manage high levels of integration between a parent company and its overseas subunit or 
whether high levels of integration develop because of the presence of expatriates in the 
affiliate. 
Finally, because we examined Japanese affiliates located in the United States and 
American affiliates located in Japan, we cannot untangle the influences of host country 
environment and nationality of the parent firm in this study. We can describe the similarities 
and differences between the two subsamples but are unable to answer the question of why 
these differences exist. More research is needed to specifically address this important research 
question. 
Conclusions 
This paper has examined the relationship between the level of integration between the 
parent company and its overseas affiliate, the level of HRM control exercised by the parent 
company over the affiliate, and the affiliate's level of performance. Organizational integration 
and control have been key topics in the field of international management for decades 
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(Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Martinez and Jarillo, 1991), although the complexity of the 
issues and the ever-changing nature of the phenomena have complicated their study. 
Nonetheless, as the global economy itself continues to become increasingly integrated, the 
survival of multinational firms will, in no small part, depend of their ability to integrate and 
control their far-flung global operations no matter where they may be. 
There is every indication that both the demands for international management 
integration and control and the external environment are becoming increasingly complex for 
the growing number of MNCs in globalizing industries (e.g., Porter, 1986; Bartlett and 
Ghoshal, 1989). It is therefore critical, for managers and academics alike, to better understand 
the complex relationships between integration, control and organizational performance. 
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